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THE CONNICK / GARCETTI SPLIT:
IS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION
A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN?
Austin J. Wishart*

I. INTRODUCTION

Of the nearly 150 million adults currently employed in the United
States 1, over 21 million are employed in the public sector.2 Public
sector employees are workers employed by the U.S. federal
government, a state, a political subdivision of a state, or an Indian
tribe.3 By contrast, private sector employees are employed by nongovernmental entities.4 In 2020, over seven million public sector
employees exercised their associational right to join a labor union.5
The union membership rate is highest in local governments, which
employ workers in heavily unionized occupations, such as police
officers, firefighters, and teachers.6 These unions, the associational
activity they exercise, and the historic labor and employment laws they
have fought for in consort with allies in the private sector, are
responsible for many of the workplace standards workers cherish
today, such as the eight-hour workday7, the forty-hour workweek8, a
minimum wage9, time-and-a-half overtime pay10, and a general
prohibition on child labor11.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Connick v. Myers12 and
Garcetti v. Ceballos13 have left the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals in
* This article would not be possible without the assistance of my friends, Paul Rando and Lisa Rosenof,
and my wife, Emily Wishart. Thank you all.
1. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2021, USDL-22-0079 (Jan.
20, 2022), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
2. Id. at tbl.3.
3. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5102(10).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Characteristics of Private Sector
Employment, (Jan. 29, 2004), https://www.eeoc.gov/special-report/characteristics-private-sectoremployment#intro.
5. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2020, USDL-21-0081 (Jan.
22, 2021), https://web.archive.org/web/20210208214526/https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.
pdf.
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C § 207.
8. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C § 206.
10. 29 U.S.C § 207.
11. 29 U.S.C § 212.
12. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
13. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

280

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 9

2022]

THE CONNICK / GARCETTI SPLIT

281

disarray on how to apply the law to public sector employee claims of
infringed First Amendment associational rights. There exists no
consensus on whether the First Amendment protects state employees’
associational activity in cases where state employees are retaliated
against for exercising their associational rights. Consequently,
individuals in public sector professions go about their daily work and
union activity with their First Amendment associational rights in an
impermissible state of limbo. In the sixteen years since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Garcetti, the circuit courts have reached a
tripartite split in determining how to apply the Connick/Garcetti
framework to state employee associational retaliation claims.
This Note examines how the circuit split developed, the current state
of the split, and how the Supreme Court may resolve the split in the
future. Additionally, this Note considers the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Janus v. AFSCME14 as the potential bellwether needed to
determine how the Court will decide the issue, with particular attention
paid to the recent shifts in the Court’s composition since Janus was
decided. Section II of this Note discusses the background of the circuit
split. Part A of Section II provides historical context of the circuit split.
Part B of Section II explores the circuit split itself. Specifically, the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Boals v. Gray,15 the Second Circuit’s
decision in Cobb v. Pozzi16 the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hatcher
v. Board Of Public Educaction & Orphanage,17 the Third Circuit’s
decision in Palardy v. Township of Millburn,18 the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Hudson v. Craven,19 and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Merrifield v. Board of County. Commissioners20 are examined. Part C
of Section II briefly discusses Janus. Finally, this Note will conclude
in Section III by urging the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split
and providing guidance as to what that resolution should be.
II. BACKGROUND

Before analyzing the circuit split at issue or the Supreme Court’s
potential solution to it, some background of how the split developed
must be examined. First, Part A describes the historical context for the
circuit split, and the cases that the Court relied on in deciding Connick
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985).
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018).
Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011).
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and Garcetti. Then, Part B examines the circuit split, focusing on the
majority group, minority group, and the unique approaches of the
circuit courts. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Boals v. Gray and the
Second Circuit’s decision in Cobb v. Pozzi serve as the representative
cases for the majority group, while the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage and the Third Circuit’s
decision in Palardy v. Township of Millburn highlight the arguments
and conclusions that the Circuit Courts have developed in the minority
group. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hudson v. Craven and the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Merrifield v. Board of County. Commissioners are
considered as unique approaches to the circuit split. Finally, Part C
discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. AFSCME.
A. Historical Context

The United States Constitution enshrines the freedoms of
speech and assembly in the First Amendment. 21 Under the First
Amendment, the federal government may not abridge “the freedom of
speech” or “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” 22 Further,
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution decrees that “no
state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”23 While the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
explicitly state that the right to association is also constitutionally
protected, the Supreme Court found in NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson
that the freedom of association is “inherent” in both the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments. 24 The Court wrote that “it is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.”25 “Whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural
matters” is “immaterial” to the protection and rights afforded to the
associational activity. 26
The Supreme Court considered the intersection of the First
Amendment and public employment in the seminal case Pickering v.
Board of Education.27 In a disagreement between a dismissed teacher
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
Id.
Id. at 460–61.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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and the Board of Education that formerly employed him, the Court
weighed the conflicting claims of First Amendment protection and the
“need for orderly school administration . . . .”28 The Board of
Education allegedly dismissed the teacher for writing and publishing a
letter criticizing the Board's allocation of school funds and the Board's
refusal to inform the school district's taxpayers of the real reasons why
additional tax revenues were being sought.29 The Board of Education
claimed “the teacher by virtue of his public employment has a duty of
loyalty to support his superiors in attaining the generally accepted
goals of education . . . .”30 The dismissed teacher argued that, for public
statements of teachers to be actionable, the statements must be made
“with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of
whether they were false or not.” 31 The teacher claimed they were
protected speech if the statements were not false or reckless, and the
teacher’s dismissal was held unconstitutional.32
Due to “the enormous variety of factual situations in which critical
statements by teachers and other public employees may be thought by
their superiors, against whom the statements are directed, to furnish
grounds for dismissal,” the Court deemed it either inappropriate or
unfeasible to issue a “general standard against which all such
statements may be judged.”33 Instead, the Court indicated “some of the
general lines along which an analysis of [conflicting claims of First
Amendment protection and the need for orderly administration] ought
to run.”34 In doing so, the Court elucidated what is now commonly
referred to as the Pickering test. The Court considered the subject
matter of the teacher’s letter as legitimate public concern, weighing (1)
the wider public’s interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance, and (2) the threat of dismissal from
public employment as a potent means of inhibiting the free speech of
a citizen commenting on matters of public importance. 35 Finding no
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by the
dismissed teacher, and considering wider public policy concerns, the
Court found that the “teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues
of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from

28.
29.
30.
31.
(1964)).
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 569.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 569 (parentheses omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
Id. at 565.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 569–74.
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public employment.”36
The Court’s decision in Pickering was re-affirmed in Smith v.
Arkansas State Highway Employees.37 However, in considering the
claim of an aggrieved state employee, the Court expanded the decision
in Pickering by holding that, although “the First Amendment is not a
substitute for the national labor relations laws[,]” public employees are
protected from retaliation when they engage in their First Amendment
right to association.38 While the Court found that the First Amendment
right to association provides no “affirmative obligation on the
government to listen, respond, or in this context, recognize the
association[,]” the Smith Court explicitly recognized the right to
association as falling under the First Amendment protections umbrella
established by Pickering.39
The intersection of the First Amendment and public employment
was further developed by the Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers.40
Returning to the Pickering conflict of balancing “the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees,”
the Court considered whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevented the discharge of Myers, a state employee, for circulating a
questionnaire concerning internal office affairs.41 The Court began by
revisiting the central holding of Pickering and affirming that
Pickering’s subject was “a matter of legitimate public concern” on
which “free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by
the electorate.”42
The Court found in Connick that, if the speech in question does not
constitute speech on a matter of public concern, the reasons for
employee discharge are irrelevant.43 Where speech “cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of [public] concern . . . ,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment.”44 For example, “[w]hen a government employee
personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 574–75.
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464–65 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 465.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 140 (alteration in original).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
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institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of
the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in
which it is delivered.”45 Whether “speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record” presented to the
court.46 Speech generally involves a matter of public concern if it
affects the social, political, or general well-being of a community. 47
Where employee speech addresses a matter of public concern, the
Pickering balancing test “requires full consideration of the
government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public.”48 However, finding that “Myers’
questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most
limited sense[,]” the Court found that Myers’ speech was “most
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning [an]
internal office policy.”49 Myers’ dismissal therefore did not violate the
First Amendment under the Pickering analysis.50
Two decades after Connick was decided, the Supreme Court
revisited the intersection of the First Amendment and state
employment in Garcetti v. Ceballos.51 The Court considered “whether
the First Amendment protects [state employees] from discipline based
on speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties.”52 Ceballos,
then deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office, wrote a memorandum recommending the dismissal
of a criminal case. 53 After submitting the memorandum to his
supervisors, Ceballos claimed that “he was subjected to a series of
retaliatory employment actions” and subsequently filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. 54
“Noting that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to his employment
duties,” the court “concluded he was not entitled to First Amendment
protection for the memo's contents.”55 However, on appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on the framework
established by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pickering and
Connick, finding that Ceballos’ “allegations of wrongdoing in the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id.
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memorandum constituted protected speech under the First
Amendment.”56 The Ninth Circuit “determined that Ceballos’ memo,
which recited what he thought to be governmental misconduct, was
inherently a matter of public concern” and protected by the First
Amendment.”57
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider whether the
First Amendment protects a government employee’s speech expressed
strictly pursuant to the duties of employment. The Court began its
analysis by affirming Pickering and Connick by ruling that “public
employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason
of their employment” and “the First Amendment protects a public
employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen
addressing matters of public concern.” 58 The Court described the
Pickering and Connick cases and their progeny as establishing a twopart test for analyzing cases where dismissed state employees claim
First Amendment protections. 59 First, the court must decide whether
the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 60 “If the
answer is no,” then the employee did not speak as a citizen on a matter
of public concern, and the employee “has no First Amendment cause
of action based on their employer’s reaction to the speech.”61 “If the
answer [to the first question] is yes,” the court must then determine
“whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.”62
In determining the first element of the test—whether Ceballos spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern when he wrote his
memorandum—the Court found that the controlling factor, in addition
to the two factors considered by Pickering and Connick, was whether
Ceballos’ expression was “made pursuant to his duties as [an
employee].”63 Ceballos speaking within his capacity as a prosecutor,
as a public employee, “distinguishes Ceballos’ case from those in
which the First Amendment [traditionally] provides protection against
discipline.”64 The Court held that where “public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
56. Id.
57. Id. at 416.
58. Id. at 417.
59. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
60. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 421.
64. Id.
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speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”65 In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that the
First Amendment shields the expressions employees make pursuant to
their professional duties from discipline, even if those expressions are
about a matter of public concern. 66 As such, under Garcetti, the First
Amendment will not protect public employees from retaliation in the
workplace where their expressions are the cause of adverse action.
B. The Circuit Split

The Supreme Court’s innocuous holdings in Pickering,
Connick, and Garcetti have left a split in the U.S. Circuit Courts. The
circuit courts arrive at radically different answers when considering
cases of alleged First Amendment freedom of association violations
and are unable to consistently answer whether the Connick publicconcern requirement ought to apply to associational cases. This Part
explores three categories of approaches. Under the majority approach,
the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits find that the publicconcern requirement of Connick applies to public employee
association claims. Under the minority approach, the Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits find that the public-concern requirement does not
apply.67 Not fitting into either box, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
each taken unique approaches to address the issue.68 The First, Eighth,
and D.C. circuits have yet to consider the issue.
1. The Majority Group:
Connick’s Public-Concern Requirement Applies to Public Employee
First Amendment Associational Claims.

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the
public-concern requirement of Connick applies to First Amendment
associational claims by public employees.69 Although these circuits
65. Id.
66. Id. at 426.
67. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231
(4th Cir. 1999); Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775
F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985); Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018); Boddie v. City of
Columbus, 989 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th
Cir. 1987).
68. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005); Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654
F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011).
69. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231
(4th Cir. 1999); Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775
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agree on the application of Connick to associational claims, they are
split on whether union-activity associational claims are matters of
public concern as a matter of law (a matter of public concern prima
facie). This division, along with the wider consensus that has been
established, will be examined under the Sixth Circuit’s Boals v. Gray
decision and the Second Circuit’s Cobb v. Pozzi decision.70
The Sixth Circuit, in Boals v. Gray, was the first circuit court to
establish that Connick’s public-concern requirement applies to public
employee First Amendment associational claims.71 The court
considered whether an employer violated the First Amendment
associational rights of Boals, a former Ohio correctional officer. 72
Boals, a former Ohio correctional officer, filed suit in United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio claiming that he had
been suspended from work for five days after actively engaging in
union activity at his place of employment. 73 The district court
“awarded Boals [damages] as compensation for the discomfort and
frustration caused by defendant's interference with his rights of
freedom of speech and association.”74 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
considered the application of Connick in the associational context as a
matter of first impression.75
At the outset of their review, the Sixth Circuit noted that the district
court failed to apply the then recently-decided Connick decision to
Boals’ claim.76 As such, the court found it appropriate to “raise the
issue of whether plaintiff's [F]irst [A]mendment rights of speech and
association as exercised in this case related to matters of public
concern and hence gave rise to a cause of action in federal court.” 77 In
doing so, the court analyzed two issues: (1) whether the Supreme
Court’s decision in “Connick applies to association [claims] as well as
speech [claims]” and (2) “whether union-related speech and
association inherently touches on a matter of public concern as a matter
of law.”78

F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985).
70. Because the Sixth and Second Circuit cases are representative of the Fourth and Seventh
Circuit positions, the Fourth and Seventh Circuit cases will not be thoroughly examined in this paper. For
a full treatment of the Fourth Circuit’s and Seventh Circuit’s positions, see Edwards, 178 F.3d 231; Klug,
197 F.3d 853.
71. Boals, 775 F.2d 686.
72. Id. at 687.
73. Id. at 689.
74. Id. at 691.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 691–92.
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Considering the first issue, the Sixth Circuit found “no logical
reason for differentiating between speech and association in applying
Connick to [F]irst [A]mendment claims.”79 While the Supreme Court
in Connick did not specifically refer to the right of association in its
opinion, it did explicitly trace a line to the decision in Pickering. The
Supreme Court found that Pickering was the controlling precedent and
held that the precedent Pickering is rooted in “invalidated statutes and
actions sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate,
or associate, in public affairs.”80 Pickering noted that government
employees ought not “be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge
from joining political parties or other associations.”81 As such, the
Sixth Circuit found that Pickering, and subsequently Connick—both
being speech cases—were “based upon and applied to freedom of
association cases.”82
Upon holding that Connick applies to freedom of association claims,
the Sixth Circuit turned to the question of whether union-related
speech and association touches on a matter of public concern as a
matter of law under the Connick test.83 Relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, the
court found that “applying Connick to union speech and activity is not
inconsistent with the well-established principle that such speech and
activity is protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”84 However, the court
also found “that an employee's speech, activity, or association, merely
because it is union-related, does not touch on a matter of public
concern as a matter of law.”85 In doing so, the court cited the District
Court for the District of Columbia’s decision in American Postal
Workers Union v. United States Postal Service to distinguish unionrelated speech and activity from speech and activity that is a matter of
public concern as a matter of law. 86 Union-related associational
activity, while potentially a matter of public concern (depending on the
facts of the case), is not a matter of public concern prima facie for the
purposes of a Connick analysis.87
The Second Circuit also recently held that the public-concern
requirement of Connick applies to associational claims. In Cobb v.
79. Id. at 692.
80. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 693.
86. Id. at 692–93 (citing American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 598 F.
Supp. 564, 568–69 (D.D.C. 1984)).
87. Id. at 693.
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Pozzi, the court considered claims by Officer Cobb and Officer Rouse,
corrections officers who alleged that they were retaliated against in
violation of the First Amendment based on their association with the
Corrections Officers’ Benevolent Association (COBA).88 The
defendants, Cobb and Rouse’s employer and superiors, argued that,
“to be protected under the First Amendment, the plaintiffs must show
that their associational activity touches on a matter of public concern”
and, “because the plaintiffs have not made this showing, their freedom
of association claim fails.”89 The defendants contended that “a
retaliation claim predicated on an employee's right to freedom of
association requires that a plaintiff satisfy Connick by demonstrating
that his associational activity touche[d] on a matter of public
concern.”90 The plaintiffs responded that Connick was instead “limited
to retaliation claims premised on free speech, and that their
associational activity, to be protected, need[ed] not touch on a matter
of public concern.”91
The Second Circuit agreed with the defendants and joined the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that a public employee
bringing a First Amendment freedom of association claim must
demonstrate that the associational conduct at issue touches on a matter
of public concern.92 To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the
Pickering and Connick decisions to reference the specific language of
employee expression.93 When discussing the public-concern
requirement, the court explicitly referenced employee expression as
protected broadly, not employee speech narrowly.94 Thus, “the Court's
concern over the proper balance of the efficient functioning of the
government and the First Amendment rights of public employees
extended more generally to all forms of First Amendment expression,
including associational activity.”95 The Second Circuit found “nothing
in Connick that would limit the public[-]concern requirement to First
Amendment claims based on free speech, as opposed to claims
premised on other forms of First Amendment expression . . . .”96
In addition to the language of Pickering and Connick, the
88. Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 101.
90. Id. at 102.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 102–03 (quoting Klug, v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.
1999); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249–50 (4th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686,
692 (6th Cir. 1985)).
93. Id. at 104.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis omitted).
96. Id.
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Second Circuit, in reaching its decision, derived support from the
Supreme Court’s “teaching that there should exist no hierarchy among
First Amendment rights.”97 The court cited language from Supreme
Court precedent in which the Court declined to elevate any particular
First Amendment right to a special status. 98 The court found that,
“[b]ecause the right of association is derivative of the First
Amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly, . . . it would
be anomalous to exempt it from Connick's public[-]concern
requirement and thereby accord it an elevated status among First
Amendment freedoms.”99 Unwilling to elevate a claim under the
freedom of association over other First Amendment rights, such as
freedom of speech or right to petition, the Second Circuit joined the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in finding that Connick’s publicconcern requirement applies to public employee associational
claims.100
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have thus reached
a consensus that the matter of public-concern requirement of Connick
also applies to public employee First Amendment associational
claims.101 Relying on the Supreme Court’s language in both Pickering
and Connick as well as the wider jurisprudence surrounding the First
Amendment, these circuits have found no satisfactory reason to treat
associational claims differently from other First Amendment claims. 102
2. The Minority Group:
Connick’s Public-Concern Requirement Does Not Apply to Public
Employee First Amendment Associational Claims.

The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts hold that the publicconcern requirement of Connick should not apply to public employee
First Amendment associational claims. 103 This consensus will be
examined under the Eleventh Circuit’s Hatcher v. Board of Public
Education & Orphanage decision and the Third Circuit’s Palardy v.
Township of Millburn decision. Because the arguments and
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985)).
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d
686 (6th Cir. 1985); Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1999).
101. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231
(4th Cir. 1999); Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775
F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985).
102. Id.
103. See Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018); Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989
F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1993); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
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conclusions raised by the Fifth Circuit are also found in the Third and
Eleventh Circuits’ opinions, the Fifth Circuit’s position will not be
examined in this Note.104
The Eleventh Circuit established the minority group position in
Hatcher v. Board of Public Education & Orphanage.105 There, the
court considered First Amendment claims raised by Hatcher, a school
principal who claimed she was demoted because she engaged in
protected associational activity. 106 Hatcher argued that her First
Amendment claim must be considered in light of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Pickering and Connick.107 The Eleventh Circuit, while
noting the difficulty in properly applying the Pickering and Connick
framework to First Amendment claims in practice, held that it need not
attempt to work through the framework because Hatcher’s claims were
based upon freedom of association. 108 The court held that freedom of
association claims are not subject to Connick because “application of
a requirement that associational activity relate to a matter of public
concern in order to be constitutionally protected would overturn
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence and exact a
substantial toll upon [F]irst [A]mendment liberties.”109 Due to these
concerns, the court declined to apply Connick to Hatcher’s
associational claim. 110
Recently, the Third Circuit in Palardy v. Township of Millburn
joined the minority.111 Palardy, a retired police officer, claimed that his
township’s business administrator, Gordon, “unlawfully prevented
him from becoming Chief of Police because Gordon opposed Palardy's
union membership and activity.”112 The United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey held that “Palardy's union-related speech
and association were not constitutionally protected” and, “[a]nalyzing
his speech and association claims together, . . . Palardy neither acted
as a private citizen nor spoke out on a matter of public concern,” as
required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti.113
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered Palardy’s case in light of
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti.
Distilling the tripartite framework to a simple rule, the Third Circuit
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

For a full treatment of the Fifth Circuit’s positions, see Boddie, 989 F.2d at 749.
Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1556–57.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 80.
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found that a public employee's speech “is protected activity when (1)
in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement
involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer
did not have ‘an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public.’”114 In
considering Palardy's freedom of association claim in light of this rule,
the Third Circuit found that it must, as a matter of first impression,
pick a side in the circuit split and determine whether Connick and
Garcetti apply to associational claims. 115
Considering Connick and Garcetti’s application, the court examined
the reasoning offered by both the majority group and the minority
group. The majority group generally found that, although in Connick
the claimant’s speech was under examination, the Supreme “Court's
concern over the proper balance of the efficient functioning of the
government and the First Amendment rights of public employees
extended more generally to all forms of First Amendment expression .
. . .”116 Further, the majority group found that it was “anomalous to
exempt [associational claims] from Connick’s public[-]concern
requirement and thereby accord [the freedom of association] an
elevated status among First Amendment freedoms.”117
In contrast, the Third Circuit explained, “the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits hold the [Connick] public[-]concern requirement does not
apply to associational claims.”118 The minority group found “no
additional proof of public concern is necessary because the union
activity of public employees ‘is not solely personal and is inevitably
of public concern.’”119 Further, citing the Supreme Court's decision in
NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, the minority group found that “it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters ... [,] state
action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny.”120
Weighing the majority group and minority group positions, the
Third Circuit found that, in Palardy’s “associational claim arising from
a public employee's union affiliation[,]” the minority group position
was the “better” position.121 The court reasoned that courts in both
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
1993)).
120.
121.

Id. at 81 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id. at 82 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.
Id. (citing NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958)).
Id.
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groups found “that at least some union speech and activity touch upon
matters of public concern[,]” satisfying Connick’s requirement.122 “It
follows, then, that a public employee’s membership in a union might
also be a matter of public concern[,]” also satisfying Connick.123 Issues
then inevitably arise as to how courts are “to distinguish between union
membership that implicates a public concern, and union membership
that does not[.]”124 The Third Circuit found that, “by holding that mere
membership in a public union is always a matter of public concern,”
the court could avoid the issue of determining which union association
is worthy of First Amendment protection entirely. 125
Further, the Third Circuit considered whether Garcetti’s privatecitizen requirement applies to “pure associational claims.”126 The court
found that, “[a]s with Connick's public-concern requirement, it does
not make . . . sense to apply Garcetti's private-citizen requirement to
pure associational claims based on union membership.”127 “By the
plain language of the Court's opinion” in Garcetti, writing that the
decision turned on whether the public employee was “mak[ing]
statements pursuant to [his] official duties,” Garcetti necessarily
applies to speech claims and not associational claims.128 Moreover, the
court found it “hard to imagine a situation where a public employee's
membership in a union would be one of [their] ‘official duties.’”129
Thus, the Third Circuit joined the minority group when it declined to
apply both Connick and Garcetti to Palardy's freedom of association
claim.130
3. Novel Approaches Considered by the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, while leaning more towards adopting
the position taken by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
in the majority group, have adopted unique approaches for addressing
public employee freedom of association claims. 131 While the Supreme
Court is unlikely to adopt either of these approaches to settle the circuit
split, the approaches taken by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits merit
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 82–83.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 84.
131. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005); Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654
F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011).
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discussion as approaches that may contend with the majority or
minority groups or as approaches that may persuade the Supreme
Court to modify the majority or minority approach.
The Ninth Circuit considered, as a matter of first impression, the
appropriate test for a hybrid speech and associational rights claim
under the First Amendment in Hudson v. Craven.132 Hudson, a
community college instructor, claimed she had been unconstitutionally
recommended for non-renewal as an instructor for exercising her First
Amendment rights.133 Finding that Hudson’s claim involved aspects
of both speech and association, and finding little satisfaction in either
the majority group or minority group approaches, the Ninth Circuit
found it appropriate to analyze the claim as a hybrid First Amendment
claim.134 Because the speech and associational rights at issue were “so
intertwined[,]” the Court saw “no reason to distinguish this hybrid
circumstance from a case involving only speech rights.”135 While the
circuit courts in the majority group and minority group analyze speech
and associational rights claims as distinct claims, the Ninth Circuit has
implicitly declined to do so. Instead, the Ninth Circuit contributes a
novel approach to the circuit split by analyzing the First Amendment
claims discussed in this Note as hybridized. 136
The Tenth Circuit considered the claims of Merrifield, a former
administrator at a youth correctional facility in Merrifield v. Board of
County Commissioners.137 Merrifield claimed that “he had been fired
in retaliation for retaining an attorney, in violation of his First
Amendment right of association.”138 The Tenth Circuit held that,
generally, the Connick “public-concern requirement applies to a claim
that a government employer retaliated against an employee for
exercising the instrumental right of freedom of association for the
purpose of engaging in speech, assembly, or petitioning for redress of
grievances.”139 The court, siding in part with the majority group, wrote
that it would be “ironic, if not unprincipled, if the public-concern
requirement derived from freedom-of-association cases did not
likewise apply to retaliation for such association.” 140
While the Tenth Circuit applied the Connick public-concern

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 696.
Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1081–82.
Id. at 1082.
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requirement to associational claims, it carved out an exception “in the
specific context of public-employee labor unions . . . .”141 The Tenth
Circuit explicitly “rejected the requirement that a worker demonstrate
that his association with the union be a matter of public concern.”142
The Tenth Circuit has thus adopted an approach that sits somewhere
between the majority and minority approaches. While Connick applies
to public employee associational claims, labor union association
claims are prima facie exempt from the same requirement. 143
C. Janus v. AFSCME: The Bellwether Case

While not directly touching on a public employee’s associational
claim, the Supreme Court recently considered the intersection of
associational activity, labor unions, and the First Amendment in Janus
v. AFSCME.144 Janus followed a long line of controversial labor law
cases that had culminated in the Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education.145 In Abood, the Court held that a public sector
labor unions’ historic practice of charging nonmembers agency fees is
constitutional under the First and Fourteenth amendments.146 In
overruling their prior decision in Abood, the Janus Court announced
that such agency fee arrangements are an unconstitutional violation of
the freedom of speech under the First Amendment. 147 Focusing
primarily on the freedom of speech under the First Amendment, the
Court examined the Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti framework.
Considering an application of Connick’s public-concern requirement
to union agency fees, the Court found that union speech in public
sector collective bargaining was overwhelmingly of great public
concern.148 Further, in considering the balancing of the overall
Pickering framework, the Court found that “the balance tips decisively
in favor of the employees’ free speech rights” in First Amendment
cases.149 Because Janus is the most recent decision in a long line of
Supreme Court cases considering the intersection of the public sector
and the First Amendment, it may be the bellwether needed to
determine how the Supreme Court should settle the circuit split.
141. Id. at 1083–84.
142. Id. at 1084 (quoting Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006)).
143. Id.
144. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
145. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB,
147 F.2d 69 (1945); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
146. Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
147. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
148. Id. at 2477.
149. Id.
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III. SETTLING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The question at the heart of this Note now lies: how should the
Supreme Court settle this circuit split if and when it reaches the Court?
While it is impossible to determine how the Supreme Court will decide
a given case, the circuit split’s historical context and the recent
precedent set in Janus, coupled with the arguments presented within
the circuit courts’ decisions elucidate a path that the Court should take
in applying Connick to public sector employee associational claims.
First, Part A of Section III argues that the Court must imminently
address the circuit split. Afterwards, Part B of Section III contends that
the Supreme Court should adopt the majority group position alongside
the Tenth Circuit’s unique approach excepting union associational
activity.
A. The Supreme Court Must Address the Split

The Supreme Court's failure to address the circuit split allows First
Amendment rights in public sector employment to exist in a state of
limbo. Currently, a public employee’s First Amendment right to
associate is constitutionally protected in the minority group circuits,
but is subject to Connick/Garcetti scrutiny in the majority group
circuits.150 In NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court
found that “state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”151 State action
is subject to the strictest of scrutiny because the rights affected by the
state action are of the utmost importance. By failing to address the
circuit split, and subsequently leaving the First Amendment rights of
public employees in limbo, the Court’s silence enables state action that
curtails public sector employee’s freedom to associate.
Public employees who are unsure about the protections afforded to
their associational activity are less likely to engage in associational
activity for fear of retaliation by their state employers. By silently
acquiescing to the current circuit split, the Court undermines the First
Amendment protections of public sector employees by chilling their
right to engage in associational activity. While associational activity
may range from benign association with coworkers after work to
concerted association to form a labor union in the workplace, all is
equally important as constitutionally ensured activity.
It is imperative that the Court issue a decision to settle this circuit
150. See, e.g., Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018); Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89
(2d Cir. 2004).
151. 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
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split and give public sector employees the peace of mind to choose to
engage in associational activity with a clear understanding as to what
legal framework will apply to their claims. Failure to remedy the split
will disincentivize public sector employees’ engagement with their
constitutionally ensured rights.
B. The Supreme Court Should Apply Connick/Garcetti to Public
Employee Association Claims, Except in the Union Context.

Based on precedent and the arguments presented by the majority
group circuit courts, the Supreme Court should adopt the Second,
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit’s approach and apply the
Connick/Garcetti framework and public-concern requirement to
public employee First Amendment associational claims. The majority
approach properly maintains historic and recent precedent and
conforms to a textualist approach. 152 These reasons will each be
considered in turn. Next, a potential downside to adoption of the
majority group approach is considered. Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s
unique approach is addressed as an additional approach the Court
should adopt in the narrow labor union context.
First, adoption of the majority group’s approach maintains the
Court’s precedent. Adherence to precedent is the preferred course of
jurisprudence “because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.”153 The Supreme Court should adopt the majority
group’s position to remedy the circuit split because the position
adheres to both historic precedent and more recent jurisprudence.
Historically, the Supreme Court has treated associational claims and
speech claims under the First Amendment as necessarily equal. 154 The
Supreme Court has traditionally held that there should exist no
hierarchy among First Amendment rights and that there is no sound
basis for affording greater protection to one First Amendment right
over another.155 The Second Circuit in Cobb utilized this fact in
support of its finding that Connick’s public-concern requirement

152. Cf. John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and Understanding
Of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S. L. WK. 393 (2011) (finding that
the majority approach among the circuit courts is not necessarily determinative of the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court) https://www.hangley.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Summers_Toward_A_
Better_Understanding_of_USSC_Decisions.pdf.
153. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)).
154. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
155. Id. at 489.
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should apply to associational claims. 156 By adopting the majority
group approach, the Court respects the historic equipoise that exists
between the First Amendment rights and does not anomalously accord
the right to association an elevated status among First Amendment
freedoms.
Further, an adoption of the majority group’s position does not
conflict with the Supreme Court’s recent precedent set in Janus. In
Janus, the Supreme Court positively cited Pickering, Connick, and
Garcetti as binding precedent at the intersection of the First
Amendment and public sector employment.157 By addressing
Pickering and its progeny as the binding line of cases that control this
area of the law, the Court supports an application of Connick/Garcetti
to the intersection of the First Amendment and public sector
employment. Coupling that recent affirmation with the Court’s
precedent of equal application of First Amendment rights, the Court
should conclude that the public-concern requirement necessarily
applies to associational rights claims of public sector employees.
Second, the majority group’s position is supported by a textualist
reading of the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent. The
Court has undoubtedly taken a textualist approach to the law over the
past decades and a textualist approach supports adoption of the
majority position.158 While the First Amendment does not explicitly
state that the right to association is constitutionally protected,159 the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson noted that, “[i]t is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
"liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”.160 In applying a
textualist approach to both the language of Pickering and Connick, the
Sixth Circuit noted that, while “Connick did not specifically refer to
association in drawing the distinction between speech on matters of
public concern and matters of private interest only[,] [i]t did . . .
suggest that its decision was simply an exposition of Pickering . . . .”161
From a plain reading of the text of Pickering, the Supreme Court in
Smith explicitly recognized the right to association as falling under the
156. Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2003).
157. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2471.
158. Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia (Sept. 29,
2017), in 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 308 (2017) (discussing Justice Scalia’s influence in the Supreme
Court’s adoption of textualism).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
160. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
161. Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985).
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First Amendment protections umbrella established by Pickering.162
One possible obstacle for adopting the majority group’s approach is
that the Connick public-concern requirement could potentially create a
higher bar to successful First Amendment associational claims for
certain public sector employees. Because employees would need to
prove that their associational activity rises to the level of public
concern, employees who are unable to argue or support that statement
may have their First Amendment claim rejected. While this
requirement for public sector employees could lead to otherwise sound
First Amendment claims being rejected by the courts, the omnipresent
threat of a false negative does not defeat established precedent and a
plain reading of the law. Any interpretation of the law that raises the
bar for a plaintiff to file a successful claim necessarily increases the
risk that a valid claim will be excluded. However, if that interpretation
of the law is the correct interpretation, the increased risk of a mistaken
exclusion is unavoidable in upholding the law as written and is
supported by precedent. It seems unlikely at this time that the risk of
false negatives would be increased by the application of the
Connick/Garcetti framework to public sector employee associational
claims, but, if such an increase develops, the Supreme Court can
modify the framework to exclude fewer valid claims.
While the Supreme Court should adopt the majority group’s
position and apply Connick/Garcetti to public sector employee First
Amendment associational claims, the Court should additionally adopt
the Tenth Circuit’s unique approach to the labor context. The Tenth
Circuit’s approach, while comparable to the broader majority group’s
approach, takes the additional step of carving out an exception in the
specific context of public sector labor unions.163 This approach has the
benefit of a broad, categorical application of the majority group’s
position while also protecting the unique legal position of public sector
unions and union members by not requiring these employees to be
subject to the public-concern requirement of Connick. The Tenth
Circuit’s approach further respects Supreme Court precedent that
elevates the position of unions in the workplace, while also
acknowledging the longstanding legal tradition that the First
Amendment ought not function as a replacement for labor law.
The Tenth Circuit’s approach respects the Court’s holding in Smith
that the First Amendment is not a substitute for labor law. 164 By
excepting associational claims within the labor law context from a
broad, categorical application of the Connick public-concern
162. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464–65 (1979).
163. Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011).
164. See Smith, 441 U.S. at 465.
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requirement, the Court would simultaneously respect the equipoise of
First Amendment rights in the broader employment context and
prevent an inadvertent undermining of labor law within the public
sector. Adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s approach paradoxically
conforms with the Third Circuit’s recent Palardy holding that
membership in a public union is always a matter of public concern. 165
In doing so, the Court avoids the impossible issue of determining
which union association is of public concern and worthy of First
Amendment protection. While following the Court’s precedent that the
First Amendment ought not supplant labor law, the Court can except
associational union activity from the broader issue of the publicconcern requirement.
Finally, adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s approach acknowledges
Janus as the controlling precedent in the labor law context. The
Supreme Court in Janus argued at length as to why Abood is not
supported by the Court’s line of decisions stemming from Pickering.166
In overturning Abood, the Court rejected the arguments raised by
proponents of maintaining Abood and explicitly rejected Pickering as
the binding precedent that undergirded the Court’s decision in
Abood.167 By excepting the labor law context from the
Connick/Garcetti framework, the Court respects the arguments raised
in Janus that overturned Abood and eliminates potential conflicts of
case law between Janus and the future Supreme Court decision
addressing this circuit split.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Connick and Garcetti have left
the Courts of Appeals in disarray. While the first of the circuit courts’
decisions came closely after Connick, the Third Circuit’s 2018
decision in Palardy demonstrates that the circuit split is alive and well.
With a new addition to the split, and an addition to the minority group
at that, it is imperative that the Supreme Court addresses the growing
split. The Supreme Court should side with the majority group and hold
that Connick’s public-concern requirement applies to public employee
First Amendment associational claims. However, the Court should
also hold that the Tenth Circuit’s broad adoption of Connick, with an
exception for union-based associational claims, is the proper
application of the Court’s prior decisions. This approach, a broad
adoption of Connick/Garcetti to associational claims with an exception
165. Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 2018).
166. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2471–74 (2018).
167. Id. at 2472.
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for union associational activity, conforms to both the Court’s
precedent and a textualist approach to the First Amendment and
precedent. Regardless of how the Court inevitably decides the circuit
split, it is imperative that the Court reaches a decision. The current
limbo that millions of public employees’ First Amendment rights exist
in is unacceptable and undermines the First Amendment as it applies
to the public sector. Public sector employees serve a critical role in our
nation. The unstable foundation that their First Amendment rights rest
on must be remedied; otherwise, their associational activity will
continue to be unacceptably chilled.
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